Grows where the grid hasn’t.
When the river runs low
Hydropower is the backbone of most grids between the Zambezi and the Nile. In 2024 the Zambezi basin had its driest year in decades and Zambia lost more than a third of its electricity. We measured how much of each grid is hydro, what a dry year takes away in megawatts, and whether the interconnectors can carry the difference.
The wires were not the only limit
- The room is smaller than the map suggests. Count only the lines that normally bring power into Zambia, from the south through Zimbabwe and through Namibia, take off what it already imports, and about 430 MW is left. Its 2024 loss averaged about 730 MW. DR Congo and Uganda also come within a factor of two of their room in the high case; Angola, Malawi and Lesotho have none; everyone else has several times more line than loss.
- And that is about what Zambia got. Imports grew from 64 MW in January 2024 to about 409 MW in July. The central corridor from South Africa moves about 500 MW northbound in total and is shared with Botswana and Zimbabwe; the Caprivi link adds 180 MW; the DRC lines normally carry power the other way, to the Copperbelt mines.
- The sellers were short too. Zimbabwe draws on the same lake and lost two thirds of Kariba South's output. Cahora Bassa kept its 2024 output by drawing storage down to 21%, then lost 30% in 2025. South Africa had little spare. Lines help only when the far end has energy.
- Imports cost double. ZESCO's import bill rose from K689 million in 2023 to K9.7 billion in 2024, at about US$0.15 per kWh against 0.07 before. Zambia's exports fell from 7.3 TWh to 2.6 TWh, so the pool lost a seller as it gained a buyer.
Different basin, same pattern
- Ethiopia is 92% hydro by capacity and 97% by output, and GERD lifted output 43% in 2024/25. Its export lines are the region's biggest buffer, but the 2,000 MW HVDC to Kenya carries under 500 MW because of limits inside Kenya's grid.
- Kenya lost 38% of its hydro in the 2022/23 drought and covered it with geothermal and imports, which rose from 197 GWh to 1,534 GWh a year. It is the one country in this set that has already lived through our high case and come out with a more diverse mix.
- Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi have small import paths (27 to 60 MW each). Burundi's own hydro fell 5% in 2024 while imports from Rusumo and Ruzizi covered 40% of supply. Uganda's 2025 problems came from waterweeds, not rain.
- The global datasets missed the drought. Ember and the US EIA still show Zambia's hydro at 17 TWh for 2024 and Zimbabwe's at 5.7 TWh. The regulators say 10.7 and about 2.0. Anyone modeling the region from global data alone is a year or more behind.
Country by country
Share of each country's power plants that is hydro, for the plants running today, the plants under construction or planned, and the electricity actually generated in 2024. Capacity comes from our SAPP and EAPP grid atlases (plants of 10 MW and above; Tanzania from the EAPP list, which carries its gas plants); generation from Ember, corrected with regulator figures where the global data missed the drought.
Shared plants (Kariba, Ruacana, Ruzizi, Rusumo) are split equally between their countries. Pipeline includes everything from under construction to early studies, so it overstates what will be built; see the delay section below. Tanzania's and Ethiopia's capacity shares include Julius Nyerere and GERD, which only reached full output after 2024.
Hydro lost against import room
We take each country's normal hydro output (the 2021 to 2023 average) and remove a share of it, then express the loss as an average megawatt over the year. Two modeled cases bracket what the record shows: a dry year that takes a fifth of hydro output, and a severe one that takes two fifths, which is what Zambia (2024) and Kenya (2022/23) lived through. The dark bar is the room on the interconnectors: the usable limit of the lines that normally carry power into the country, less the firm imports it already buys.
Angola and Malawi have no operating interconnector yet (Malawi's 400 kV link to Mozambique was energized in August 2026 at 50 MW). Lesotho's listed line limit is below what it already imports, so the SAPP list is incomplete there. A loss spread over the year understates the peak: Zambia's average 2024 loss was about 730 MW, but its evening deficit reached 1,300 MW.
Interconnectors: rated, usable, used
The SAPP publishes a thermal rating and an applicable (usable) limit for each tie line; the gap between them is set by voltage and stability, not by the conductor. Actual flows are rarely published, so we show the few public figures we found. Lines SAPP or the utilities have named as bottlenecks are marked.
| Corridor | Pool | kV | Thermal rating MW | Usable limit MW | Usable share | Observed flow MW | Status |
|---|
Sources: SAPP transfer limits (2026), SAPP monthly and quarterly reports, HCB, NamPower via The Namibian, KETRACO and EPRA. Observed flows are yearly or monthly averages and are not comparable with peak limits; HCB's 950 MW to Eskom in 2024 used both the Songo - Apollo HVDC and the MOTRACO path. Mozambique to Malawi and Zambia to Tanzania are not listed because they were not yet trading in November 2026.
Hydro in the pipeline, and when it really arrives
About 15 GW of hydro in these 17 countries has a stated commissioning year; another 10 GW (Inga III, Batoka Gorge and others) has none. Our Promised vs Built study found that the 15 regional projects completed so far arrived a median of five years late and none on time. The lighter bars shift every stated year by that median.
Recent record: GERD about 8 years late, Karuma 6, Rusumo 4, Julius Nyerere 3; Batoka Gorge was due to start construction in 2020 and now targets first power in 2028 at the earliest; Mphanda Nkuwa has moved from 2031 to 2034. Most of the dated pipeline is in the same Zambezi and Nile basins as today's plants, so it adds capacity without adding much diversity.
All 17 countries
| Country | Pool | Operating MW | Hydro share | Pipeline hydro share | Hydro in 2024 generation | Normal hydro TWh | Low case loss MW | High case loss MW | Observed 2024 | Import room MW |
|---|
Average MW over a year. "R" marks a 2024 figure taken from the national regulator instead of the global dataset. Import room is the usable limit of the tie lines that normally carry power into the country (listed in the method panel) less firm imports already contracted (SAPP monthly report, August 2026). Ethiopia is counted with no import path, and Kenya's line from Ethiopia at the 500 MW its grid can take. The data is available on request: email [email protected].
Method, sources and updates
How we calculate it
Hydro shares. From the plant lists in our SAPP and EAPP grid atlases: Global Energy Monitor, WRI, AICD and OpenStreetMap plants of 10 MW and above plus curated project records. Operating, under construction and planned are the atlas statuses; duplicates between sources are removed and plants shared by two countries are split in half.
Normal year and cases. Normal hydro output is the 2021 to 2023 average from Ember (US EIA based), replaced by regulator figures for Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Eswatini, Kenya and Burundi where Ember is missing or wrong. The low and high cases remove 20% and 40% of that output; dividing by 8,760 hours gives the average MW shown. Observed 2024 changes are regulator numbers against the same normal year.
Import room. SAPP applicable transfer limits, summed over the lines that normally carry power into the country, less firm imports from the SAPP monthly report. Direction follows the SAPP monthly and utility reports: Zambia through Kariba North - Kariba South and the Caprivi link (the DRC lines flow north); Zimbabwe from Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and South Africa; southern Mozambique and Eswatini through the MOTRACO and Komatipoort lines; South Africa from Cahora Bassa; Namibia from South Africa and Zambia; Botswana from South Africa and Zimbabwe; DR Congo through the three Zambian lines; Tanzania from Kenya and Rusumo. For the EAPP we use the rated capacity in our atlas, with Ethiopia counted as an exporter (no import path) and the Ethiopia - Kenya line at the 500 MW Kenya's grid can take.
No composite scores. The cases are brackets, not forecasts; a real dry year hits the evening peak harder than the yearly average suggests.
Sources
Energy Regulation Board of Zambia, Annual Statistical Bulletins 2024 and 2025 and Energy Sector Report 2024; ZESCO Integrated Reports 2024 and 2025; Zambezi River Authority water allocation and hydrological statements 2024 to 2026; ZimStat Index of Electricity Generation; HCB Relatorio e Contas 2024; EEC Integrated Annual Report 2025; LHDA electricity billed to LEC; EWURA Electricity Sub-Sector Performance Report 2023/24; EPRA Energy and Petroleum Statistics 2023/24 and June 2025; AREEN Rapport Annuel 2024; RURA and MININFRA Rwanda; EEP via press; CSIR Utility Statistics January 2025; SAPP transfer limits, monthly and quarterly reports 2025 to 2026; KETRACO; Ember yearly electricity data (CC BY 4.0); Aloe Energy SAPP and EAPP grid atlases and Promised vs Built study; Ansar, Flyvbjerg, Budzier and Lunn (2014) on dam schedules.
Public data only, indicative, not for system planning or investment decisions. Interconnector limits change with every SAPP update. The full source list with links is in the data pack, available on request.
What changed
We rerun this every May, after the rainy season, when regulators publish the previous year. Plant changes arrive through the monthly atlas refreshes.
- November 2026 - First edition: 17 countries, 2021 to 2024 generation, SAPP transfer limits as of 2026, two modeled cases and the observed 2024 drought.
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Common questions
How much of Zambia's electricity comes from hydro?
About 81% of installed capacity and 80% of 2024 generation, according to the Energy Regulation Board. In a normal year the share is higher, around 88%, because the thermal and solar plants run harder when the dams are low.
Why did Kariba produce so little in 2024?
The Zambezi River Authority allocated 16 billion cubic meters of water for 2024, about half a normal year, after the 2023/24 El Nino rains failed. Spread over the year that is about 214 MW per utility from stations rated 1,080 MW and 1,050 MW. Live storage fell to 2% by the end of December 2024. The 2026 allocation is back to 36 billion cubic meters.
Could Zambia have imported its way out of the shortage?
Not fully. The lines that bring power into Zambia, from the south through Zimbabwe and through Namibia, have about 600 MW of usable capacity, and 175 MW of that was already contracted. The central corridor from South Africa is also shared with Botswana and Zimbabwe, and Zimbabwe and Mozambique were short of water too. Imports peaked around 400 MW against a deficit of 800 to 1,300 MW.
Which country is most exposed to a dry year?
By share of capacity, Ethiopia, DR Congo, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia and Angola are all above 60% hydro. By the size of the loss against import room, Zambia and DR Congo are the tightest. We do not rank countries with a score; the table shows each measure separately.
Where does the data come from?
National regulators and utilities for generation (ERB, ZimStat, HCB, EEC, LHDA, EWURA, EPRA, AREEN and others), Ember for the rest, SAPP transfer limits for the lines, and our own grid atlases for the plants. All of it is public; the full list is in the data pack, available by email.